Protecting National Security Whistleblowers in the U.S. and in the ECtHR: The Limits of Balancing and the Social Value of Public Disclosures

37 Pages Posted: 8 May 2020 Last revised: 13 Jan 2022

See all articles by Ioannis Kampourakis

Ioannis Kampourakis

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Date Written: April 14, 2020

Abstract

This article discusses the comparative responses from the U.S. and the European Court of Human Rights to the conundrum posed by whistleblowing in national security. Concluding that both systems have focused excessively on the subjective aspect of whistleblowing as a facet of freedom of speech, the article proceeds to propose an innovative, institutional framing of the conflict over public disclosures, building on the transnational precedent that confirms the social value of whistleblowing for democratic self-government and public accountability. Concretely, this means that when state secrecy covers illegal and illegitimate activities of the executive power, then whistleblowers should be entitled to protection against criminal sanctions. Such an approach shifts the criterion of protection from balancing between subjective rights and the public interest, to the legitimacy of the disclosed activity. At the same time, legitimate state secrecy should be protected through sanctions (primarily employment-related and only exceptionally criminal) to leakers.

Keywords: whistleblowing, national security, state secrecy, freedom of speech, comparative law, proportionality

Suggested Citation

Kampourakis, Ioannis, Protecting National Security Whistleblowers in the U.S. and in the ECtHR: The Limits of Balancing and the Social Value of Public Disclosures (April 14, 2020). Yale Journal of International Law (2021) 46(2), 241-276, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576036

Ioannis Kampourakis (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.eur.nl/en/people/ioannis-kampourakis

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