Information Asymmetry Effects of Deregulation-Driven Decreases in Quarterly Financial Disclosure - Evidence from Germany

51 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2019 Last revised: 16 Apr 2020

See all articles by Janina Knappstein

Janina Knappstein

Ruhr University of Bochum - Faculty of Management and Economics

Marco Muschallik

Ruhr University of Bochum - Department of International Accounting

André Schmidt

Ruhr University of Bochum - Department of International Accounting

Date Written: April 15, 2020

Abstract

Based on the ongoing disclosure overload debate, this paper investigates how deregulation-driven decreases in quarterly disclosure affect information asymmetry. We exploit a German setting in which the minimum content requirements for quarterly reporting have been reduced for firms listed in the Prime Standard segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). This deregulation allows Prime Standard companies to choose whether to continue to publish full quarterly financial reports or to switch to so-called quarterly statements to meet their quarterly reporting obligations. Compared to full quarterly reports, the latter have significantly lower minimum content requirements. Based on a difference-in-differences research design, our results provide empirical evidence that decreases in quarterly disclosure come along with statistically and economically significant increases in information asymmetry. However, we find that this effect is particularly driven by smaller firms, which operate in weaker information environments. Additionally, our results confirm that this information asymmetry effect is associated with the extent of actual decreases in (specific content-related types of) quarterly disclosure.

Keywords: Quarterly Reporting, Reporting Frequency, Information Asymmetry

JEL Classification: G10, G12, G14, G18, M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Knappstein, Janina and Muschallik, Marco and Schmidt, André, Information Asymmetry Effects of Deregulation-Driven Decreases in Quarterly Financial Disclosure - Evidence from Germany (April 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278236 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3278236

Janina Knappstein (Contact Author)

Ruhr University of Bochum - Faculty of Management and Economics ( email )

Bochum, 44801
Germany

Marco Muschallik

Ruhr University of Bochum - Department of International Accounting ( email )

Bochum
Germany

André Schmidt

Ruhr University of Bochum - Department of International Accounting ( email )

Bochum
Germany

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