Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s Egalitarian Solution on the Domain of Convex Games

Calleja, Pedro; Llerena, Francesc; Sudhölter, Peter

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3577521

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Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s Egalitarian Solution on the Domain of Convex Games

Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 4/2020

15 Pages Posted: 11 May 2020

See all articles by Pedro Calleja

Pedro Calleja

University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics

Peter Sudhölter

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics

Date Written: April 16, 2020

Abstract

We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing "poorest" by "poorer" allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, strengthening core selection into bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler, and Pareto optimality into individual rationality and bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell, we obtain alternative and stylized axiomatic approaches.

Keywords: Dutta-Rays egalitarian solution, axiomatizations, convex TU game

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Calleja, Pedro and Llerena, Francesc and Sudhölter, Peter, Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s Egalitarian Solution on the Domain of Convex Games (April 16, 2020). Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 4/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577521 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577521