The Role of Internal Control Disclosure in Financial Reporting Precision and the Quality of Audited Financial Reports

36 Pages Posted: 4 May 2020 Last revised: 25 Mar 2024

See all articles by Mingcherng Deng

Mingcherng Deng

City University of New York (CUNY) - Baruch College

Xiaoyan Wen

Texas Christian University

Date Written: February 29, 2024

Abstract

We study the impact of internal control disclosure in a model in which a client company privately invests corporate resources in its internal control system that subsequently determines its financial reporting precision. Without internal control disclosure, the capital market cannot observe the precision and must price the client value based on its conjecture. With internal control disclosure requirement, the effectiveness of internal controls is disclosed, which reveals the precision to the market. Thus, internal control disclosure provides the client another channel to influence the market pricing. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find that the client tends to invest less in its internal control system with disclosure requirement. As a result of lower precision, internal control disclosure may lower the informativeness of audited financial reports, albeit ex-post communicating more information to the market. We also find that internal control disclosure reduces the client's ex-ante payoff when the auditor bears a high misstatement cost due to audit failure.

Keywords: Internal control; Misstatement cost; Audit quality

JEL Classification: M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Deng, Mingcherng and Wen, Xiaoyan, The Role of Internal Control Disclosure in Financial Reporting Precision and the Quality of Audited Financial Reports (February 29, 2024). Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper No. 2020-03-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578030 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3578030

Mingcherng Deng

City University of New York (CUNY) - Baruch College ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way, Box B12-225
New York, NY 10010
United States

Xiaoyan Wen (Contact Author)

Texas Christian University ( email )

M.J. Neeley School of Business
TCU Box 298530
Fort Worth, TX 76129
United States

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