Coordination and Social Distancing: Inertia in the Aggregate Response to COVID-19

14 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2020 Last revised: 24 Aug 2020

See all articles by Mehdi Shadmehr

Mehdi Shadmehr

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 17, 2020

Abstract

Social distancing --- which is critical for mitigating the spread of COVID-19 --- has been slow and inadequate. Applying the literature on beauty contest models, we show: (1) When a new and rare virus, like COVID-19, emerges, the aggregate level of social distancing has inherent inertia. Novel infectious diseases abruptly change the appropriate level of social distancing, leaving individuals uncertain about how to act. Inertia arises because individuals care about conforming to social norms (e.g., it is awkward to refuse a social invitation or work request) and the common knowledge about the past norm of social distancing help individuals coordinate behavior. (2) Clear national public statements are essential in reducing that inertia and adjusting the public's behavior to the new, optimal level of social distancing. Such national statements enable individuals and communities to coordinate on new norms of behavior, reducing inertia and moving the society closer to the optimum. They generate a beneficial over-reaction from the public that helps offset the over-weighting of past experience. (3) National communication is better than local communication when optimal social distancing levels are highly correlated over-time and when individuals are poorly-informed, so that the overweighting of prior social distancing norms is more severe.

Keywords: COVID-19, Social Distancing, Social Norms, Public Health Campaigns

JEL Classification: D7, D82, D83, H41, H51, H75, I1

Suggested Citation

Shadmehr, Mehdi and Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, Coordination and Social Distancing: Inertia in the Aggregate Response to COVID-19 (April 17, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568535 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3568535

Mehdi Shadmehr (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy ( email )

Abernathy Hall
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3435
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mehdishadmehr.com

Ethan Bueno De Mesquita

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
93
Abstract Views
2,199
Rank
241,719
PlumX Metrics