A Reconsideration of Inter-Group Cooperation with Defect Problem, with an Application to the Climate Change Issue

52 Pages Posted: 16 May 2020

See all articles by Yanling Guo

Yanling Guo

Goethe University Frankfurt; Bundeswehr University Munich

Date Written: January 13, 2020

Abstract

Research has shown that seeking to benefit the own group can under certain conditions achieve the opposite result when the beneficiary inter-group cooperation opportunity is undermined with a prisoners’ dilemma type tribal interest conflict. In this paper, I reconsider this problem using knowledge gained from various disciplines ranging from psychology to social economics, to gain more insight. As an exercise, I apply the result to analyze the dealing with the climate change, while other applications are possible.

Keywords: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Goods Game, Common Pasture, CPR Problems, Tribal Con- Flict, Inter-Group Cooperation, Polycentric Governance, Utilitarianism, Impartial Utilitarianism, Tribal Utilitarianism, Climate Change

JEL Classification: A10, B40, C71, F34, H63, I31, Q50

Suggested Citation

Guo, Yanling, A Reconsideration of Inter-Group Cooperation with Defect Problem, with an Application to the Climate Change Issue (January 13, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581283 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581283

Yanling Guo (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Frankfurt
Germany

Bundeswehr University Munich ( email )

Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39
Neubiberg, 85577
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
86
Abstract Views
918
Rank
765,566
PlumX Metrics