The Process of Democratic Breakdown: Controlling Information While Evading Term Limits

37 Pages Posted: 19 May 2020 Last revised: 13 Jul 2020

See all articles by JunHyeok Jang

JunHyeok Jang

University of California, Merced

Date Written: July 12, 2020

Abstract

Politicians who erode democratic institutions to consolidate personal powers are expected to encounter opposition. The violation of fundamental constitutional arrangements such as term limits, so-called “bright line" institutions, should result, particularly, in anti-government movements. Empirically, however, we observe decreased rather than increased anti-government mobilization after term limit evasions. I argue that political leaders pre-empt protests during and after term limit evasions by limiting the free flow of information. Using difference-in-differences within a matched set that shares the history of treatments and a similar level of covariates, I show that term limit evasions are followed by a significant decrease in a country’s freedomof expression. In addition, using Venezuela as an example, I provide micro-evidence of information control by investigating how topics of opposition media change after term-limit evasion. Specifically, automated text analysis shows that a leader evading termlimits not only censors threatening political information but also induces the media to offer distracting and apolitical information.

Keywords: Term Limit Evasion, Democratic Breakdown, Authoritarianism, Self-Enforcing Democracy, Information Control

Suggested Citation

Jang, JunHyeok, The Process of Democratic Breakdown: Controlling Information While Evading Term Limits (July 12, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3582395 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3582395

Junhyeok Jang (Contact Author)

University of California, Merced ( email )

Merced, CA
United States

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