Download This PaperStable Improvement Cycles in a Controlled School Choice
31 Pages Posted: 20 May 2020 Last revised: 18 Nov 2021
Date Written: April 22, 2020
Abstract
We consider a stable improvement problem in a controlled school choice model
which covers those of several previous studies. First, we consider the case where the
priority for each school is a weak order. We derive a sufficient condition for a stable
matching to be constrained efficient. It is also a necessary condition, and utilizing
this property, we provide a class of algorithms each of which, once a stable matching
is obtained, derives a constrained efficient matching that Pareto dominates the initial
matching. We further allow that the inter-type priorities are not weak but just partial orders.
Although the sufficient part holds, the necessity part does not, and there remains
a case where our algorithms cannot derive any constrained efficient matching.
Keywords: Matching; Controlled school choice; Affirmative action; Weak priorities; Partial priorities
JEL Classification: C78; D47
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation