Interpersonal Comparisons of What?
The Journal of Philosophy, volume 120, issue 1, 2023[10.5840/jphil202312011]
36 Pages Posted: 12 May 2020 Last revised: 31 Oct 2024
Date Written: April 14, 2022
Abstract
I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not only compatible with, but even comforted by, the current state of the field. I submit that all in all, the most accurate philosophical assessment consists not in flatly rejecting this necessity claim, but in accepting it in suitably revised form.
Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Social Welfare Functional, Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare, IIA, Arrow, Sen, Borda Count, Relative Utilitarianism
JEL Classification: D6, D7, I3, B4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation