Does Audit Regulation Improve the Underlying Information Used by Managers? Evidence from PCAOB Inspection Access and Management Forecast Accuracy

56 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2019 Last revised: 15 Sep 2022

See all articles by Brant E. Christensen

Brant E. Christensen

Brigham Young University

Lijun (Gillian) Lei

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Sydney Qing Shu

Miami University of Ohio - Department of Accountancy

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma

Date Written: September 15, 2022

Abstract

Survey evidence and academic research raise the possibility that audit regulation can impact not only the information contained in external financial reports but also the internal information used by management. We investigate this possibility by examining the improvement in management forecast accuracy around initiation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) international inspection program. Consistent with managers having improved information, we find that managers issue more accurate forecasts following PCAOB inspection access. Multiple additional analyses support that an improved information environment is the mechanism underlying our results, and this effect is distinct from, and incremental to, any effects of PCAOB inspection on external reporting quality. Our study provides evidence that audit regulation benefits an important internal stakeholder—managers.

Keywords: PCAOB inspection; voluntary disclosure; management forecast accuracy; audit regulation

JEL Classification: G18, M41, M42, M48

Suggested Citation

Christensen, Brant E. and Lei, Lijun (Gillian) and Shu, Sydney Qing and Thomas, Wayne B., Does Audit Regulation Improve the Underlying Information Used by Managers? Evidence from PCAOB Inspection Access and Management Forecast Accuracy (September 15, 2022). Accounting, Organizations and Society, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3313562

Brant E. Christensen

Brigham Young University ( email )

United States

Lijun (Gillian) Lei

University of North Carolina at Greensboro ( email )

P.O.Box 26170
Greensboro, NC 27412
United States

Sydney Qing Shu (Contact Author)

Miami University of Ohio - Department of Accountancy

3094 Farmer School of Business
800 E. High St.
Oxford, OH 45056
United States

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma ( email )

Michael F. Price College of Business,
307 W Brooks, Rm 212B
Norman, OK 73019
United States
405-325-5789 (Phone)
405-325-7348 (Fax)

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