Health versus Wealth: On the Distributional Effects of Controlling a Pandemic

50 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2020 Last revised: 18 Aug 2020

See all articles by Andrew Glover

Andrew Glover

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Jonathan Heathcote

Minneapolis Fed

Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Goethe University Frankfurt; Netspar

José-Victor Rios-Rull

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; NBER Research Associate

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 21, 2020

Abstract

To slow COVID-19, many countries have shut down part of the economy. Older individuals have the most to gain from slowing virus diffusion. Younger workers in sectors that are shuttered have most to lose. In this paper, we build a model in which economic activity and disease progression are jointly determined. Individuals differ by age (young, retired), by sector (basic, luxury), and health status. Disease transmission occurs in the workplace, through consumption, at home, and in hospitals. We study the optimal economic mitigation policy for a government that can redistribute across individuals, but where redistribution is costly. Optimal redistribution and mitigation policies interact, and more modest shutdowns are optimal when redistribution is more costly. We find that the shutdowns that were implemented in mid-April were too extensive, but a partial shutdown should remain in place through the fall. A deeper and longer shutdown is preferred if a vaccine is imminent.

Keywords: COVID-19; Economic Policy; Redistribution

Suggested Citation

Glover, Andrew and Heathcote, Jonathan and Krueger, Dirk and Rios-Rull, José-Victor, Health versus Wealth: On the Distributional Effects of Controlling a Pandemic (July 21, 2020). PIER Working Paper No. 20-014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3583489 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3583489

Andrew Glover

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City ( email )

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Jonathan Heathcote

Minneapolis Fed ( email )

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Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Goethe University Frankfurt

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Netspar

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José-Victor Rios-Rull (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
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215-573-2057 (Fax)

NBER Research Associate

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