Download This PaperConformity and Influence
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 19(1) DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0066
48 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2016 Last revised: 24 Apr 2020
Date Written: November 10, 2018
Abstract
I model the behavior of decision-makers seeking conformity and influence in a connected population. The model allows for one-sided linking, with information flowing from the target to the link's originator. Conformity is achieved only with a social order, necessitating differentiated rewards despite \emph{ex ante} homogeneity. The leader holds a strategic social location \emph{ex post}, exerting influence independent of any leadership traits. A strong desire to influence produces non-conforming autonomous decision-makers. Socially detrimental multiple leaders can be sustained as well.
Keywords: Opinion leadership; Social networks; Conformity; Non-cooperative games
JEL Classification: C72, D83, D85
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation