Strengthening Public Health Systems: Policy Ideas from a Governance Perspective

62 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2020

See all articles by Stuti Khemani

Stuti Khemani

World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Sarang Chaudhary

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Thiago Scot

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Date Written: April 23, 2020

Abstract

Public health systems that are capable of disease surveillance and action to prevent and manage outbreaks require trustworthy community-embedded public health workers who are empowered to undertake their tasks as professionals. Economic theory on incentives and norms of agents tasked with performing activities that society cares about yield direct implications for how to recruit and manage frontline health workers to promote trustworthiness and professionalism. This paper provides novel evidence from a survey of public health workers in Bihar, India's poorest state, that supports the insights of economic theory and taken together yields ideas that can immediately be put to work in policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis. These ideas address problems of governance and trust that have bedeviled health policymakers. Managing the current and preventing future pandemics requires going beyond technical health policies to the political institutions that shape incentives and norms of health workers tasked with implementing those policies.

Suggested Citation

Khemani, Stuti and Chaudhary, Sarang and Scot, Thiago, Strengthening Public Health Systems: Policy Ideas from a Governance Perspective (April 23, 2020). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9220, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584840

Stuti Khemani (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/skhemani

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Sarang Chaudhary

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Thiago Scot

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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