Download This PaperDuty to Re-Negotiate in the International Commercial Law and Uncontemplated Behavioural Effects
25 Pages Posted: 21 May 2020
Date Written: April 25, 2020
Abstract
This paper explores potential uncontemplated effects and behavioural implications of the duty-to-negotiate in the international law. More particularly, this paper investigates the approach of five different international instruments concerning the subject: the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and Common European Sales Law (CESL). Paper investigates to what extent those international and European legal instruments correspond with recent economic and behavioural findings. Moreover, this paper offers economically inspired analysis of uncontemplated consequences of the duty to renegotiate which were never anticipated by the well-intended international lawmakers. Furthermore, paper suggests that there might be sound game theoretical and behavioural reasons for the cautious approach towards the duty-to-renegotiate in cases of unforeseen contingencies found in CISG and in English, German, US and Scottish law of contracts.
Keywords: Duty to renegotiate, Game theory, Behavioural economics, Change of circumstances, International commercial law
JEL Classification: C23, C26, C51, K42, O43
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