Health versus Wealth: On the Distributional Effects of Controlling a Pandemic

62 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2020 Last revised: 27 May 2026

See all articles by Andrew Glover

Andrew Glover

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics

Jonathan Heathcote

Minneapolis Fed

Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Goethe University Frankfurt; Netspar

José-Victor Rios-Rull

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; NBER Research Associate

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2020

Abstract

To slow the spread of the COVID-19 virus, many countries shut down parts of the economy. Older individuals have the most to gain from slowing virus diffusion. Younger workers in sectors that are shuttered have most to lose. We build a model in which economic activity and disease progression are jointly determined. Individuals differ by age (young, retired), by sector (basic, luxury), and by health status. Disease transmission occurs in the workplace, through consumption, at home, and in hospitals. We study the optimal economic mitigation policy for a government that can redistribute through taxes and transfers, but where taxation distorts labor supply. We show that shutdowns are optimally milder in 2020 when taxes are distortionary, and when the government does not have access to debt. A harder but shorter shutdown is preferred when vaccines become available in the first half of 2021.

Suggested Citation

Glover, Andrew and Heathcote, Jonathan and Krueger, Dirk and Rios-Rull, José-Victor, Health versus Wealth: On the Distributional Effects of Controlling a Pandemic (April 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27046, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3586178

Andrew Glover (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

Jonathan Heathcote

Minneapolis Fed ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jonathanheathcote.com

Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Goethe University Frankfurt

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Germany

Netspar

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Netherlands

José-Victor Rios-Rull

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
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Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7767 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

NBER Research Associate

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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