Bubbly Bailout

59 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2020 Last revised: 14 Apr 2022

See all articles by Feng Dong

Feng Dong

Tsinghua University - Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management

Zhiwei Xu

Fudan University - School of Economics

Date Written: January 1, 2020

Abstract

We provide a theory to investigate the implications of time-varying bailout policy for rational bubbles in an infinite-horizon production economy. In particular, we ask two questions. First, should the government bailout asset bubbles? Second, if yes, how? In our model, firms face idiosyncratic
investment opportunities and financial frictions, and creating new bubbles incurs real resources. Intrinsically useless assets can alleviate firms' credit constraints and enhance investment efficiency with additional liquidity. However, asset bubbles are vulnerable to market sentiment and
resource-consuming. The time-varying probability of bubble burst causes both asset price volatility and economic fluctuations. In the presence of this tradeoff, we examine the efficiency and the welfare implications of the time-varying bailout policy. We find that the optimal bailout policy is
leaning against the wind, striking a balance between the crowding-in and crowding-out effect.

Keywords: Asset Bubbles, Financial Risks, Bailout, Time-Varying Policy

JEL Classification: E32, E44, E61

Suggested Citation

Dong, Feng and Xu, Zhiwei, Bubbly Bailout (January 1, 2020). Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538044 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3538044

Feng Dong (Contact Author)

Tsinghua University - Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management ( email )

Room 623, Lihua Building, School of Economics and
Beijing, Beijing 100084
China

Zhiwei Xu

Fudan University - School of Economics ( email )

600 GuoQuan Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

HOME PAGE: http://https://xuzhiwei09.wixsite.com/econ

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