Are Government Bonds Net Wealth or a Liability? ---Optimal Debt and Taxes in an OLG Model with Uninsurable Income Risk

36 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2020 Last revised: 19 Jun 2022

See all articles by YiLi Chien

YiLi Chien

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Yi Wen

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Department; Tsinghua University

HsinJung Wu

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: April, 2020

Abstract

A positive national debt is often rationalized either by the assumption of dynamic inefficiency in an overlapping-generations (OLG) model, or by the hypothesis of heterogeneous-agents and incomplete-markets (HAIM) in an infinite horizon model. Both assumptions imply insufficient private liquidity to support private saving and investment, thus calling for a positive level of public debt to improve social welfare. However, since public debt is financed often by distortionary future taxes, optimal debt and tax policies ought to be studied jointly in a single framework. In this paper we use a primal Ramsey approach to analytically characterize optimal debt and tax policy in an OLG-HAIM model. We show that (i) public debt can be a liability instead of net wealth, despite insufficient private liquidity to support private saving and investment, and (ii) such a debt policy can dramatically change the government's optimal tax scheme since the sign and magnitude of the optimal quantity of debt dictate the sign and magnitude of optimal taxes as well as the priority order of tax tools (such as a labor tax vs. a capital tax) in financing the public debt.

Keywords: Role of Public Debt, overlapping generations, Ramsey Problem, Incomplete Markets, Optimal Fiscal Policy

JEL Classification: E13, E62, H21, H30

Suggested Citation

Chien, YiLi and Wen, Yi and Wu, HsinJung, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth or a Liability? ---Optimal Debt and Taxes in an OLG Model with Uninsurable Income Risk (April, 2020). FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2020-7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587694 or http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2020.007

Yili Chien (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ( email )

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

Yi Wen

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Department ( email )

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States
314-444-8559 (Phone)
314-444-8731 (Fax)

Tsinghua University ( email )

Beijing, 100084
China

Hsinjung Wu

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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