How Better Client Service Performance Affects Auditors’ Willingness to Challenge Management’s Preferred Accounting

53 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2018 Last revised: 11 Apr 2025

See all articles by Michael Ricci

Michael Ricci

University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting

Date Written: May 31, 2022

Abstract

Client service is a defining feature of the auditing profession. Auditors are coached to manage their daily interactions with client managers by providing better client service (e.g., communicating timely, minimizing disruptions, and being accessible). However, the effects of better client service performance on auditors’ judgments about accounting issues are not well understood. Psychology theory suggests that better client service performance could either impair or improve auditors’ judgments, depending upon whether performance is framed as an expression of goal commitment (i.e., the importance of a goal) or as an indication of goal progress (i.e., moving forward on a goal). In an experiment, I find theory-consistent evidence that with commitment framing, better client service performers are less willing to challenge management’s preferred accounting than worse performers. With progress framing, this deleterious effect of client service performance is eliminated. However, inconsistent with theory, progress framing does not cause better client service performers to be more challenging than worse performers. Taken together, this study provides new evidence about the age-old tension between client satisfaction and audit quality. Satisfying clients by providing better service can compromise audit quality, but not necessarily.

Keywords: client service, client satisfaction, audit quality, goals

Suggested Citation

Ricci, Michael, How Better Client Service Performance Affects Auditors’ Willingness to Challenge Management’s Preferred Accounting (May 31, 2022). Accounting, Organizations and Society, Forthcoming https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2022.101377, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3098412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3098412

Michael Ricci (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting ( email )

Warrington College of Business
PO Box 117166
Gainesville, FL 32611-7166
United States

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