The Market Timing of Mergers and Acquisitions – Evidence from Ramadan

Finance

51 Pages Posted: 28 May 2020 Last revised: 14 May 2024

See all articles by Muhammad Farooq Ahmad

Muhammad Farooq Ahmad

SKEMA Business School – Université Côte d'Azur

Helen Bollaert

SKEMA Business School

Date Written: May 10, 2020

Abstract

We investigate market timing behaviors by corporate managers. During Ramadan, the perceived overvaluation of firms may induce managers to time acquisitions. We find that, consistent with the market timing hypothesis, on average during Ramadan, aggregate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity is higher, managers are less likely to listen to the market and post-acquisition performance is lower. Further analyses show differing results for the top three M&A countries in our sample. Results for Malaysia show strong evidence for detrimental market timing during Ramadan: for deals announced during the period, managers are less likely to listen to the market, the probability of stock acquisitions is higher as is the probability of deal completion, and post-merger operating performance is worse. Conversely, there is no evidence for market timing in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. We tentatively interpret results for the latter two countries as consistent with religious sentiment leading to higher quality deals during Ramadan.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Finance and Religion; Behavioral Finance; Islamic Finance

JEL Classification: G34, G41

Suggested Citation

Ahmad, Muhammad Farooq and Bollaert, Helen, The Market Timing of Mergers and Acquisitions – Evidence from Ramadan (May 10, 2020). Finance, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589309

Muhammad Farooq Ahmad

SKEMA Business School – Université Côte d'Azur ( email )

Campus de Lille, Avenue Willy Brandt,
Lille, 59777
France

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mfarooqahmad85

Helen Bollaert (Contact Author)

SKEMA Business School ( email )

Avenue Willy Brandt
Euralille, 59777
France

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