Does Capital Market Distrust CSR Reporting?: Economic Benefits in Presence of Complementary Monitoring Mechanism

28 Pages Posted: 29 May 2020

See all articles by Isabel Garcia-Sanchez

Isabel Garcia-Sanchez

University of Salamanca

Jennifer Ferrero

Multidisciplinary Institute for Enterprise (IME), University of Salamanca

Tania Azevedo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: January 1, 2019

Abstract

From a theoretical point of view, corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure actions have associated a large list of benefits as result of the lower information asymmetry problems that provoke firms enjoy better financial conditions and higher market value. However, empirically there is no unanimity in the academy about these positive impacts. In this paper, we consider that the possible discretionary decision that managers could have in the elaboration of CSR report implies distrust about the credibility and utility of sustainability information. In this regard, the presence of independent in boards, directors that ensure better control of management decision, could moderate the relationship between the quality of CSR reports and its benefits. Independent directors, in their decision making process, associate their personal image, reputation and career with the CSR disclosures. For an international sample of analysis, our empirical evidence supports the premise that the market only positively assesses the utility and comparability of corporate social responsibility information, giving firms a superior value when there is a complementary mechanism that guarantee information credibility.

Keywords: CSR, Disclosure, Firm Performance, Cost of Capital, Information Asymmetry

JEL Classification: M14, M41

Suggested Citation

Garcia-Sanchez, Isabel and Ferrero, Jennifer and Azevedo, Tania, Does Capital Market Distrust CSR Reporting?: Economic Benefits in Presence of Complementary Monitoring Mechanism (January 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3590222

Isabel Garcia-Sanchez (Contact Author)

University of Salamanca ( email )

Campus Miguel de Unamuno
ES-37007 Salamanca, Salamanca 23007
Spain

Jennifer Ferrero

Multidisciplinary Institute for Enterprise (IME), University of Salamanca ( email )

Campus Miguel de Unamuno
Salamanca, ES-37007
Spain

Tania Azevedo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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