The Value of Financial Intermediation: Evidence from Online Debt Crowdfunding

52 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2020 Last revised: 31 Oct 2024

See all articles by Fabio Braggion

Fabio Braggion

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Alberto Manconi

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Nicola Pavanini

Tilburg University; Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management; CEPR IO Programme

Haikun Zhu

China Europe International Business School (CEIBS)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 11, 2022

Abstract

Most online marketplaces are peer-to-peer. Credit ones, however, are not and they have resurrected many features of traditional financial intermediaries. To understand why, we use online credit as a laboratory to investigate the value of financial intermediation. We develop a structural model of online debt crowdfunding and estimate it on a novel database. We find that abandoning the peer-to-peer paradigm raises lender surplus, platform profits, and credit provision, but exposes investors to liquidity risk. A counterfactual where the platform resembles a bank by bearing liquidity risk can generate larger lender surplus and credit provision when liquidity is low and lenders are risk averse. 

Keywords: Marketplace credit, Chinese financial system, Structural estimation

JEL Classification: D14, D61, G21, G51, L21

Suggested Citation

Braggion, Fabio and Manconi, Alberto and Pavanini, Nicola and Zhu, Haikun, The Value of Financial Intermediation: Evidence from Online Debt Crowdfunding (November 11, 2022). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper 719/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557942

Fabio Braggion

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Alberto Manconi (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://mypage.unibocconi.eu/albertomanconi/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Nicola Pavanini

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/nicolapavanini/

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE Ti
Netherlands

CEPR IO Programme ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Haikun Zhu

China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) ( email )

Shanghai-Hongfeng Road
Shanghai 201206
Shanghai 201206
China

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