Asset Prices and Portfolios with Externalities

Review of Finance 26(6): 1433–1468, 2022

57 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2019 Last revised: 22 Nov 2022

See all articles by Steven D. Baker

Steven D. Baker

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Burton Hollifield

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Emilio Osambela

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: September 19, 2022

Abstract

Elementary portfolio theory implies that environmentalists optimally hold more shares of polluting firms than non-environmentalists, and that polluting firms attract more investment capital than otherwise identical non-polluting firms through a hedging channel. Pigouvian taxation can reverse the aggregate investment results, but environmentalists still overweight polluters. We introduce countervailing motives for environmentalists to underweight polluters, comparing the implications when environmentalists coordinate to internalize pollution, or have nonpecuniary disutility from holding polluter stock. With nonpecuniary disutility, introducing a green derivative may dramatically alter who invests most in polluters, but has no impact on aggregate pollution.

Keywords: ESG, Externality, Hedging, Portfolio Theory, Socially responsible investment

JEL Classification: G11, H23, G18

Suggested Citation

Baker, Steven D. and Hollifield, Burton and Osambela, Emilio, Asset Prices and Portfolios with Externalities (September 19, 2022). Review of Finance 26(6): 1433–1468, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3344940

Steven D. Baker

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

530 E Trade Street
Charlotte, NC 28202
United States

Burton Hollifield

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
(412) 268-6505 (Phone)
(412) 268-6837 (Fax)

Emilio Osambela (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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