Innovation, Inventor Mobility, and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements

61 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2023 Last revised: 12 Jan 2026

See all articles by Matthew S. Johnson

Matthew S. Johnson

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy

Michael Lipsitz

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alison Pei

Duke University - Department of Economics; Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy

Date Written: July 2023

Abstract

Firms often restrict workers’ mobility with Noncompete Agreements (NCAs). Using state-level law changes, we find that making NCAs easier to enforce (“stricter” enforceability) leads to fewer patents, an effect that we show reflects a loss in innovation. While stricter enforceability encourages firms’ R&D investment, consistent with alleviating hold-up concerns, it also limits inventors’ job mobility and new business formation; supplementary evidence indicates the decline in mobility stifles knowledge diffusion. Analyses of technology-specific nationwide exposure, as well as cross-state spillovers via firms’ corporate networks, reveal that our state-level estimates, if anything, understate the economy-wide effects of NCA enforceability on innovation.

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Matthew and Lipsitz, Michael and Pei, Alison, Innovation, Inventor Mobility, and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements (July 2023). NBER Working Paper No. w31487, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4519249

Matthew Johnson (Contact Author)

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy ( email )

201 Science Drive
Box 90312
Durham, NC 27708-0239
United States

Michael Lipsitz

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alison Pei

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy ( email )

201 Science Drive
Box 90312
Durham, NC 27708-0239
United States

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