The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility

127 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2023 Last revised: 30 Mar 2025

See all articles by Matthew S. Johnson

Matthew S. Johnson

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy

Kurt Lavetti

Ohio State University

Michael Lipsitz

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2023

Abstract

We analyze how the legal enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) affects labor markets. Using newly-constructed panel data, we find that higher NCA enforceability diminishes workers’ earnings and job mobility, with larger effects among workers most likely to sign NCAs. These effects are far-reaching: increasing enforceability imposes externalities on workers across state borders, suggesting broad effects on labor market dynamism. We show enforceability affects wages by reducing outside options and preventing workers from leveraging tight labor markets to increase earnings. We motivate these findings with a model of search and bargaining. Finally, higher NCA enforceability exacerbates gender and racial earnings gaps.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Matthew and Lavetti, Kurt and Lipsitz, Michael, The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility (December 2023). NBER Working Paper No. w31929, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4660254

Matthew Johnson (Contact Author)

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy ( email )

201 Science Drive
Box 90312
Durham, NC 27708-0239
United States

Kurt Lavetti

Ohio State University ( email )

410 Arps Hall
1945 North High Street
Columbus, OH 43210
United States

Michael Lipsitz

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
846
PlumX Metrics