Cournot Versus Supply Functions: What Does the Data Tell Us?

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2007-63

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2007-023

27 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2007 Last revised: 16 Aug 2009

See all articles by Bert Willems

Bert Willems

UCLouvain - LIDAM / CORE; Tilburg University - Department of Economics - CentER & TILEC; University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Ina Rumiantseva

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Hannes Weigt

WWZ, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Basel

Date Written: August 2007

Abstract

The liberalization of the electricity sector increases the need for realistic and robust models of the oligopolistic interaction of electricity firms. This paper compares the two most popular models: Cournot and the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), and tests which model describes the observed market data best. Using identical demand and supply specifications, both models are calibrated to the German electricity market by varying the contract cover of firms. Our results show that each model explains an identical fraction of the observed price variation. We therefore suggest using Cournot models for short term analysis, as more market details, such as network constraints, can be accommodated. As the SFE model is less sensitive to the choice of the calibration parameters, it might be more appropriate for long term analysis, such as the study of a merger.

Keywords: supply function equilibrium, Cournot competition, electricity markets

JEL Classification: L94, L13, C72, D43

Suggested Citation

Willems, Bert and Rumiantseva, Ina and Weigt, Hannes, Cournot Versus Supply Functions: What Does the Data Tell Us? (August 2007). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2007-63, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2007-023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1010074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1010074

Bert Willems (Contact Author)

UCLouvain - LIDAM / CORE ( email )

Place Montesquieu, 3
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

Tilburg University - Department of Economics - CentER & TILEC ( email )

P.O. Box 90153 Room K308
Tilburg, 5000LE
Netherlands
+31134662588 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bertwillems.com

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Ina Rumiantseva

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Hannes Weigt

WWZ, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Basel ( email )

Basel, 4051
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://fonew.unibas.ch/

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