Social Security Reform: Evaluating Current Proposals: Latest Results of the EBRI-SSASIM2 Policy Simulation Model

24 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2007

See all articles by Craig Copeland

Craig Copeland

Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)

Jack VanDerhei

Morningstar Center for Retirement and Policy Studies

Dallas Salisbury

Independent

Abstract

The present Social Security program has been shown to be financially unsustainable in the future without modification to the current program. The purpose of this paper, the Employee Benefit Research Institute's fourth in a series on Social Security reform, is threefold: to illustrate new features of the EBRI-SSASIM2 Policy Simulation Model not available in earlier EBRI publications, to expand quantitative analysis to specific proposals, and to evaluate the uncertainty involved in proposals that rely on equity investment. This analysis compares the Gregg/Breaux-Kolbe/Stenholm (GB-KS) and Moynihan/Kerrey proposals with three generic or "traditional" reforms: increasing taxes, reducing benefits, and/or increasing the retirement age. Both proposals would create individual accounts by "carving out" funds from current Social Security payroll taxes. This analysis also examines other proposed changes that would "add on" to existing Social Security funds through the use of general revenue transfers and/or investment in the equities market.

Keywords: Social Security benefits, Social Security financing, Social Security modeling, Social Security reform

JEL Classification: H55

Suggested Citation

Copeland, Craig and VanDerhei, Jack and Salisbury, Dallas, Social Security Reform: Evaluating Current Proposals: Latest Results of the EBRI-SSASIM2 Policy Simulation Model. EBRI Issue Brief, No. 210, June 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1013376

Craig Copeland (Contact Author)

Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) ( email )

1100 13th Street, NW
Suite 878
Washington, DC 20005-4204
United States
202-775-6356 (Phone)
202-775-6312 (Fax)

Jack VanDerhei

Morningstar Center for Retirement and Policy Studies ( email )

22 W Washington Street
Chicago, IL 60602
United States

Dallas Salisbury

Independent ( email )

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