The American Origins of Liberal and Illiberal Regimes of International Economic Governance in the Marshall Court

42 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2010

See all articles by James Thuo Gathii

James Thuo Gathii

Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

This article provides an examination of the United States’ jurisprudence from a time when the U.S. was not a world military power. Instead, the U.S. sought neutrality on the world stage because of its military might could not match its European trading partners. However, military might did not exclusively impact decisions involving Europe, but Native American tribes as well.

This article argues that the Marshall Court ensured that U.S. jurisprudence would protect U.S. economic interests through reciprocal economic regimes. The policy opposed the regime of the more powerful military states. At the same time, however, while the Marshall Court was solidifying strong rules of reciprocity and equal exchange, it was simultaneously proceeding to produce jurisprudence of conquest and of non-reciprocal relations with the Indian populations of the United States.

The essay discusses the US military weaknesses and its economic dependency on Europe in the late eighteenth century to early nineteenth century. It then discusses the judicial creativity of the Marshall Court in regards to establishing rules of equal exchange between neutrals and belligerents during war. Last it explores how the Marshall court, at the same time, created rules of unequal exchange with the Indian nations.

Suggested Citation

Gathii, James Thuo, The American Origins of Liberal and Illiberal Regimes of International Economic Governance in the Marshall Court (2006). Buffalo Law Review Vol. 54, No. 765, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1625033

James Thuo Gathii (Contact Author)

Loyola University Chicago School of Law ( email )

25 East Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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