How Much do Firms Pay as Bribes and What Benefits do They Get? Evidence from Corruption Cases Worldwide

39 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2011 Last revised: 14 Sep 2012

See all articles by Stephen Yan-Leung Cheung

Stephen Yan-Leung Cheung

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) - Department of Economics & Finance

P. Raghavendra Rau

University of Cambridge

Aris Stouraitis

Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU) - Department of Finance and Decision Sciences

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 30, 2012

Abstract

We analyze a hand-collected sample of 166 prominent bribery cases, involving 107 publicly listed firms from 20 stock markets that have been reported to have bribed government officials in 52 countries worldwide during 1971-2007. We focus on the initial date of award of the contract for which the bribe was paid (rather than of the revelation of the bribery). Our data enable us to describe in detail the mechanisms through which bribes affect firm value. We find that firm performance, the rank of the politicians bribed, as well as bribe-paying and bribe-taking country characteristics affect the magnitude of the bribes and the benefits that firms derive from them.

Keywords: Corruption, bribes, firm performance, country characteristics

JEL Classification: G14, G34, F23, K42, M14

Suggested Citation

Cheung, Stephen Yan-Leung and Rau, P. Raghavendra and Stouraitis, Aristotelis, How Much do Firms Pay as Bribes and What Benefits do They Get? Evidence from Corruption Cases Worldwide (March 30, 2012). 24th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2011 Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1772246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1772246

Stephen Yan-Leung Cheung

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong
+852 2788 7960 (Phone)
+852 2788 8806 (Fax)

P. Raghavendra Rau (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge ( email )

Cambridge Judge Business School
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Cambridge, Cambridgeshire CB21AG
United Kingdom
3103626793 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.raghurau.com/

Aristotelis Stouraitis

Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU) - Department of Finance and Decision Sciences ( email )

Hong Kong

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