The Hired Gun Mechanism

12 Pages Posted: 9 May 2011 Last revised: 15 Jan 2023

See all articles by James Andreoni

James Andreoni

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Laura Gee

Tufts University; IZA

Date Written: May 2011

Abstract

We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader-the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly.

Suggested Citation

Andreoni, James and Gee, Laura, The Hired Gun Mechanism (May 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17032, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1833168

James Andreoni (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.ucsd.edu/~jandreon/

Laura Gee

Tufts University ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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