Theft and Deterrence

33 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2011

See all articles by William T. Harbaugh

William T. Harbaugh

University of Oregon - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Naci H. Mocan

Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Visser

Sonoma State University - School of Business and Economics

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Abstract

We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.

Keywords: crime, punishment, incentives, deterrence, juvenile, arrest, risk, larceny

JEL Classification: K4

Suggested Citation

Harbaugh, William T. and Mocan, Naci H. and Visser, Michael, Theft and Deterrence. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5813, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1877626 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1877626

William T. Harbaugh (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States
541-346-1244 (Phone)
541-346-1243 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Naci H. Mocan

Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of economics
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-6308
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Michael Visser

Sonoma State University - School of Business and Economics ( email )

1801 East Cotati Avenue
Rohnert Park, CA 94928
United States

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