Survival and Long-Run Dynamics with Heterogeneous Beliefs under Recursive Preferences

Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming

41 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2012 Last revised: 26 Apr 2019

See all articles by Jaroslav Borovička

Jaroslav Borovička

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 31, 2018

Abstract

I study the long-run behavior of an economy with two types of agents who differ in their beliefs and are endowed with homothetic recursive preferences of the Duffie-Epstein-Zin type. Contrary to models with separable preferences in which the wealth of agents with incorrect beliefs vanishes in the long run, recursive preference specifications lead to long-run outcomes where both agents survive, or more incorrect agents dominate. I derive analytical conditions for the existence of nondegenerate long-run equilibria in which agents with differently accurate beliefs coexist in the long run, and show that these equilibria exist for broad ranges of plausible parameterizations when risk aversion is larger than the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The results highlight a crucial interaction between risk sharing, speculative behavior and consumption-saving choice of agents with heterogeneous beliefs, and the role of equilibrium prices in shaping long-run outcomes.

Keywords: survival, recursive preferences, heterogeneous beliefs, variational utility, risk sharing, speculation, consumption-saving decision

JEL Classification: D53, D84, E21, G10

Suggested Citation

Borovička, Jaroslav, Survival and Long-Run Dynamics with Heterogeneous Beliefs under Recursive Preferences (August 31, 2018). Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2023501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023501

Jaroslav Borovička (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

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New York, NY 10012
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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