Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression

International Organization 59, Summer 2005, pp. 593-629

37 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2015

Date Written: June 1, 2005

Abstract

A growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have come to play a significant role in governing state compliance with human rights When they supply hard standards that tie material benefits of integration to compliance with human rights principles, PTAs are more effective than softer human rights agreements (HRAs) in changing repressive behaviors PTAs improve members’ human rights through coercion, by supplying the instruments and resources to change actors’ incentives to promote reforms that would not otherwise be implemented I develop three hypotheses: (1) state commitment to HRAs and (2) PTAs supplying soft human rights standards (not tied to market benefits) do not systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors, while (3) state commitment to PTAs supplying hard human rights standards does often produce better practices. I draw on several cases to illustrate the processes of influence and test the argument on the experience of 177 states during the period 1972 to 2002

Keywords: Human Rights, Trade, Trade Agreements, PTA, Human Rights Agreements, Behavior, International Relations

Suggested Citation

Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression (June 1, 2005). International Organization 59, Summer 2005, pp. 593-629, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2701389

Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton (Contact Author)

UCSD School of Global Policy and Strategy ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States

HOME PAGE: http://gps.ucsd.edu/ehafner/

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
90
Abstract Views
953
Rank
513,289
PlumX Metrics