The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores

11 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2003

See all articles by Martin Shubik

Martin Shubik

Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: October 2003

Abstract

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.

Keywords: Market game, strategic market game, exchange economy, core, characteristic function

JEL Classification: C71, D5

Suggested Citation

Shubik, Martin, The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores (October 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=464220

Martin Shubik (Contact Author)

Yale University - School of Management ( email )

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New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3694 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_shubik.htm

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