Incentives for CEOS with Multitasks: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
42 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Abstract
Because each of the agent's multitasks can have several measures, the multitask agency theory predicts that incentive devices based on these measures can be complements or substitutes. However, the existing empirical literature on multitask agency considers only complementarity. This paper investigates both complementarity and substitutability of measures of CEO compensation theoretically and empirically. Using a panel data set of CEO contracts from more than 300 Chinese state-owned enterprises, we find empirical evidence that profits are not the only objective of the Chinese government in designing CEO contracts. Our findings about the determinants of incentive devices in China support predictions of the agency theory and the incomplete contracts theory.
Keywords: CEO compensation, agency, multitask, complementarity, state-owned enterprises
JEL Classification: D82, J33, J41, M12, L02, L30, P50, G30
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