Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism

29 Pages Posted: 25 May 2005

See all articles by Joni Hersch

Joni Hersch

Vanderbilt University - Law School; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

Using data from Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplements spanning 1992-2002, this study shows that smokers who plan to quit smoking are more supportive of regulations than are other smokers. Failed quitters who plan to try again are more supportive of restrictions than are smokers planning to quit for the first time. These findings indicate that many smokers support regulatory restrictions to reduce their costs of quitting by exploiting the discipline offered by regulatory control. From 1992 to 2002, support for smoking restrictions in public areas rose dramatically among both nonsmokers and smokers.

Keywords: Time-inconsistency, addiction, smoking restrictions, smoking cessation, cigarettes

JEL Classification: I18, I12, H00

Suggested Citation

Hersch, Joni, Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism (May 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=729488 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.729488

Joni Hersch (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7717 (Phone)
615-322-6631 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/?pid=joni-hersch

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States

HOME PAGE: http://business.vanderbilt.edu/bio/joni-hersch/

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

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