WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector

43 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2005

See all articles by Chad P. Bown

Chad P. Bown

Peterson Institute for International Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Bernard Hoekman

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Economic Research Forum (ERF)

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Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

The poorest WTO member countries almost universally fail to engage as either complainants or interested third parties in formal dispute settlement activity related to their market access interests. This paper focuses on costs of the WTO's extended litigation process as an explanation for the potential but "missing" developing country engagement. We provide a positive examination of the current system, and we catalogue and analyze a set of proposals encouraging the private sector to provide DSU-specific legal assistance to poor countries. We investigate the role of legal service centres, non-governmental organizations, development organizations, international trade litigators, economists, consumer organizations, and even law schools to provide poor countries with the missing services needed at critical stages of the WTO's extended litigation process. In the absence of systemic rules reform, the public-private partnership model imposes a substantial cooperation burden on such groups as they organize export interests, estimate the size of improved market access payoffs, prioritize across potential cases, engage domestic governments, prepare legal briefs, assist in evidentiary discovery, and pursue the public relations effort required to induce foreign political compliance.

Keywords: WTO, Dispute Settlement, Developing Countries

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Bown, Chad P. and Hoekman, Bernard, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector (May 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=746384 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.746384

Chad P. Bown (Contact Author)

Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Bernard Hoekman

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

via Boccaccio 121
Florence, Florence 50133
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Economic Research Forum (ERF) ( email )

21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly St.
(P.O. Box: 12311)
Dokki, Cairo
Egypt

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