How Corruption Hits People When They are Down

40 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2006

See all articles by Jennifer Hunt

Jennifer Hunt

McGill University - Department of Economics; Rutgers University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: September 2006

Abstract

Using cross-country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.

Keywords: Corruption, bribery, governance

JEL Classification: H1, K4, O1

Suggested Citation

Hunt, Jennifer and Hunt, Jennifer, How Corruption Hits People When They are Down (September 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5855, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=951805

Jennifer Hunt (Contact Author)

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