Eminent Domain, Inc.

45 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2007 Last revised: 24 Dec 2007

See all articles by Amnon Lehavi

Amnon Lehavi

Reichman University - Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Harry Radziner School of Law

Amir N. Licht

Reichman University; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

This Essay proposes a novel solution for "squaring the eminent domain circle" when large-scale, for-profit development projects require the assembly of land from numerous private property owners. Such "anticommons" situations may justify government intervention through eminent domain, yet they often leave landowners undercompensated. This may skew the incentives for initiating land development projects and lead to considerable injustice. Although the taking component of eminent domain may need to remain an involuntary nonmarket transaction, we propose a market-based mechanism for the compensation component in the form of a Special-Purpose Development Corporation (SPDC). An SPDC would acquire unified ownership of the land and the development project, and would offer condemnees a choice between receiving pre-project "fair market value" compensation or pro rata shares in the SPDC. This would make it more likely that compensation is closely linked to true economic value of the land and, consequently, that land assembly projects are both more just and genuinely social-welfare maximizing.

Keywords: eminent domain, takings, just compensation, anticommons, corporate governance, development, redelopment, kelo, public use, corporation, option, land readjustment, compulsory purchase, regeneration, special purpose vehicle, securities, markets, taxation, local government, stock exchange, public goods

JEL Classification: D2, D4, D6, D7, G1, G3, H2, H4, H7, K11, K2, L1

Suggested Citation

Lehavi, Amnon and Licht, Amir N., Eminent Domain, Inc.. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 107, p. 1704, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967970

Amnon Lehavi (Contact Author)

Reichman University - Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Harry Radziner School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
972 9 9602765 (Phone)
972 9 9568605 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.idc.ac.il

Amir N. Licht

Reichman University ( email )

Israel

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium
952-9-9513323 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

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