The Investor Recognition Hypothesis in a Dynamic General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence
50 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2000
There are 3 versions of this paper
The Investor Recognition Hypothesis in a Dynamic General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence
The Investor Recognition Hypothesis in a Dynamic General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence
Date Written: February 2001
Abstract
This article analyzes a dynamic general equilibrium under a generalization of Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. A class of informationally constrained investors is assumed to implement only a particular trading strategy. The model implies that, all else equal, a risk premium on a less visible stock need not be higher than that on a more visible stock with a lower volatility -- contrary to results derived in a static mean-variance setting. A consumption-based capital asset pricing model augmented by the generalized investor recognition hypothesis emerges as a viable contender for explaining the cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected equity returns.
JEL Classification: G12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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