Implementing Efficient Market Structure
23 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2000
Date Written: March 2000
Abstract
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Natural Oligopoly, Auctions, Entry
JEL Classification: D43, D44, D45, H20, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Grimm, Veronika and Riedel, Frank and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., Implementing Efficient Market Structure (March 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=216388 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.216388
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