A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 481

27 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2000

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

João E. Gata

Instituto Superior de Gestao

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Keywords: Conflict Management, International Sanctions, Arms Embargo, International Political Market, Pressure Groups

JEL Classification: C72, D74, K33

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Gata, João Eduardo, A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning (2000). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 481, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=235677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.235677

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

João Eduardo Gata

Instituto Superior de Gestao ( email )

Ave. Vitorino Nemesio 5
Lisboa, P-1750-306
Portugal
351-217570053 (Phone)

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