Output Insecurity and Ownership Disputes as Barriers to Technology Diffusion

79 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2022

See all articles by Oscar Camacho

Oscar Camacho

Drexel University

Michelle R. Garfinkel

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Constantinos Syropoulos

LeBow College of Business, Drexel University

Yoto V. Yotov

Drexel University - Department of Economics & International Business

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

This paper examines both the desirability and feasibility of technology transfers in a setting where institutions governing the security of output or income are imperfect. Based on a guns-versus-butter model involving two countries (a technology leader and a technology laggard), our analysis characterizes how global efficiency and the countries’ preferences over transfers depend on the nature of technology, as well as on the initial technological distance between them and the degree of output security. In the case of a general-purpose technology the leader might refuse a transfer, whereas in the case of a sector-specific technology the laggard might have such an incentive. Notably, for both types of technology, our analysis reveals the possible emergence of a “low-technology trap,” wherein a technology transfer to the laggard is more likely to be blocked precisely when the laggard’s initial technology is sufficiently inferior to its rival. We explore how the degree of output security and the laggard's capacity to absorb state-of-the-art technology affect the range of technological distances that generate such traps for each type of technology.

Keywords: output insecurity, arming policies, power, technology transfers, sanctions

JEL Classification: D300, D740, F510, O330

Suggested Citation

Camacho, Oscar and Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Syropoulos, Constantinos and Yotov, Yoto, Output Insecurity and Ownership Disputes as Barriers to Technology Diffusion (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 10027, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4259624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4259624

Oscar Camacho (Contact Author)

Drexel University ( email )

3141 Chestnut St
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Michelle R. Garfinkel

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-824-3190 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.uci.edu/~mrgarfin/

Constantinos Syropoulos

LeBow College of Business, Drexel University ( email )

3141 Chestnut St
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-895-2792 (Phone)
215-895-6975 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.lebow.drexel.edu/SyropoulosC/

Yoto Yotov

Drexel University - Department of Economics & International Business ( email )

3141 Chestnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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