Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

59 Pages Posted: 21 Oct 2015 Last revised: 4 Jun 2016

See all articles by Bill Francis

Bill Francis

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - Lally School of Management & Technology

Iftekhar Hasan

Fordham University ; Bank of Finland; University of Sydney

Qiang Wu

Bank of Finland

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 7, 2014

Abstract

Directors from academia served on the boards of around 40% of S&P 1,500 firms over the 1998-2011 period. This paper investigates the effects of academic directors on corporate governance and firm performance. We find that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance and this relation is driven by professors without administrative jobs. We also find that academic directors play an important governance role through their advising and monitoring functions. Specifically, our results show that the presence of academic directors is associated with higher acquisition performance, higher number of patents and citations, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower CEO compensation, and higher CEO forced turnover-performance sensitivity. Overall, our results provide supportive evidence that academic directors are valuable advisors and effective monitors and that, in general, firms benefit from having academic directors.

Suggested Citation

Francis, Bill and Hasan, Iftekhar and Wu, Qiang, Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (July 7, 2014). Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 15/2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676983

Bill Francis (Contact Author)

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - Lally School of Management & Technology ( email )

110 8th St
Troy, NY 12180
United States

Iftekhar Hasan

Fordham University ( email )

45 COLUMBUS AVENUE
GBA-5TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10023
United States

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

University of Sydney ( email )

P.O. Box H58
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

Qiang Wu

Bank of Finland

P.O. Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

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