Incentivizing Cooperation Against a Norm of Defection: Experimental Evidence from Egypt

54 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2022

See all articles by Sarah Mansour

Sarah Mansour

Cairo University - Faculty of Economics & Political Science

Mazen Hassan

Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science

Engi Amin

Cairo University - Faculty of Economics & Political Science

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

Voluntary cooperation contributes significantly to development and prosperity. Settings where the social norm is free-riding, however, offer a particular challenge for public goods contribution. In this paper we ask two questions: how could high contributors to public goods in such contexts be encouraged to sustain their contributions against a defecting crowd? Second, how can low contributors – who are abundant in such milieus – be lured to increase their contributions without expensive institutional interventions or major structural transformations? To answer these questions, we conducted two public good experiments with 276 participants in Egypt. In the first experiment, we find that priming high cooperators with a message that makes them take pride in being among the minority of cooperators increases contributions, albeit with a lag. In the second experiment, we test how far three possible appeal messages – emphasizing religious, patriotic, or social harm– could drive low cooperators to increase their contributions. We show that using such messages does increase contributions significantly. Some of our findings indicate, however, that primes could interact with dominant cultural traits – i.e. psychology of honor – making some interventions backfire over time, for particular participants.

Keywords: Cooperation, public goods game, pride, appeals, Egypt

Suggested Citation

Mansour, Sarah and Hassan, Mazen and Amin, Engi and Voigt, Stefan, Incentivizing Cooperation Against a Norm of Defection: Experimental Evidence from Egypt. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4139064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4139064

Sarah Mansour (Contact Author)

Cairo University - Faculty of Economics & Political Science ( email )

Cairo University
Giza
Egypt

Mazen Hassan

Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science ( email )

Orman
Giza, 12613
Egypt

HOME PAGE: http://www.feps.edu.eg/en/staffpages/edit/listall.php?wids=&namm=m.hassan

Engi Amin

Cairo University - Faculty of Economics & Political Science ( email )

Cairo University
Giza, Giza
Egypt

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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