Flexible Labor and Innovation Performance: Evidence from Longitudinal Firm-Level Data

33 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2010

See all articles by Haibo Zhou

Haibo Zhou

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Ronald Dekker

ReflecT, Tilburg University; Economics of Innovation, Delft University of Technology

Alfred Kleinknecht

Delft University of Technology - Economics of Innovation

Date Written: 21 2010 1,

Abstract

Firms with high shares of workers on fixed-term contracts have significantly higher sales of imitative new products but perform significantly worse on sales of inno¬va¬tive new products (“first on the market”). High functional flexibility in “insider-outsider” la¬bor markets enhances a firm’s new product sales, as do training efforts and highly edu¬ca¬¬ted personnel. We find weak evidence that larger and older firms have higher new pro¬duct sales than do younger and smaller firms. Our findings should be food for thought to eco-nomists making unqualified pleas for the deregulation of labor markets.

Keywords: J5, M5, O15, O31, innovation performance, new product sales, numerical flexibility, OSA longitudinal dataset, SMEs

JEL Classification: M13, O32, M, O31

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Haibo and Dekker, Ronald and Kleinknecht, Alfred, Flexible Labor and Innovation Performance: Evidence from Longitudinal Firm-Level Data (21 2010 1,). ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-2010-007-ORG, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1550013

Haibo Zhou (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Ronald Dekker

ReflecT, Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/reflect

Economics of Innovation, Delft University of Technology ( email )

Jaffalaan 5
2628 BX Delft
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.eci.tbm.tudelft.nl/live/pagina.jsp?id=e2b14b2c-3665-4449-8212-b557a9d29965&lang=nl

Alfred Kleinknecht

Delft University of Technology - Economics of Innovation ( email )

Jaffalaan 5
2628 BX Delft
Netherlands

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