Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks: Some Comments and Considerations

18 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2008

See all articles by Lawrence J. White

Lawrence J. White

Stern School of Business, New York University; New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Antitrust and regulatory concerns continue to swirl around the payment cards industry, for understandable reasons: The industry is clearly not atomistic in structure; it has substantial network characteristics and thus embodies network externalities; it involves two-sided markets; and its two most prominent members -- Visa and MasterCard -- are network joint ventures of the banks that issue credit and debit cards to individual cardholders and that enroll (acquire) and service the merchants who accept those cards.These characteristics raise the possibility that the industry may not be fully competitive that market power may currently be present and/or may prospectively be created or enhanced as a consequence of a merger and thus raise potential policy concerns. But these same characteristics also cloud the standard against which the performance of the industry should be judged. And they complicate the analysis that is necessary to form judgments.This essay attempts to clarify some of these issues while exploring the same themes as does Emch and Thompson (2006): market definition, market power, and payment card networks.

Keywords: Antitrust, regulation, market definition,, market power, mergers, monopolization, payment networks

Suggested Citation

White, Lawrence J. and White, Lawrence J., Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks: Some Comments and Considerations (2006). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26065, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1281947

Lawrence J. White (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Stern School of Business, New York University ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0880 (Phone)
212-995-4218 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
115
Abstract Views
1,056
Rank
436,852
PlumX Metrics