Would Stricter Capital Requirements Raise the Cost of Capital? Bank Capital Regulation and the Low Risk Anomaly

52 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2013

See all articles by Malcolm P. Baker

Malcolm P. Baker

Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeffrey Wurgler

NYU Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 5 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2013

Abstract

Capital requirements for banks must balance a number of factors, including any effects on the cost of capital and in turn the rates available to borrowers. Standard theory predicts that, in perfect and efficient capital markets, reducing banks’ leverage would reduce the risk and cost of their equity but leave the overall weighted average cost of capital unchanged. We test these two predictions empirically. We confirm that the equity of better-capitalized banks has both lower systematic risk (beta) and lower idiosyncratic risk. However, over the last 40 years in the United States, lower risk banks have higher stock returns on a risk-adjusted or even a raw basis, a pattern consistent with a stock market anomaly previously documented in other samples. A simple calibration using historical data suggests that a ten percentage-point increase in Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets would have increased the weighted average cost of capital by between 60 and 90 basis points per year. In competitive lending markets, a change of this magnitude would have doubled or tripled spreads, because bank asset betas implied an average risk premium of only 40 basis points above Treasury yields over that same period.

Suggested Citation

Baker, Malcolm P. and Wurgler, Jeffrey A., Would Stricter Capital Requirements Raise the Cost of Capital? Bank Capital Regulation and the Low Risk Anomaly (March 2013). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31748, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2255881

Malcolm P. Baker

Harvard Business School ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6566 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/mbaker

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Jeffrey A. Wurgler

NYU Stern School of Business ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0367 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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