Self-Signaling in Voting

37 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2022

See all articles by Lydia Mechtenberg

Lydia Mechtenberg

University of Hamburg

Grischa Perino

University of Hamburg

Nicolas Treich

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stephanie Wang

University of Pittsburgh

Abstract

This paper presents a two-wave survey experiment on self-image concerns in voting. We elicit votes on a ballot initiative in Switzerland that spurred campaigns involving widely shared normative values. We investigate how messages that change the self-signaling value of a Yes vote affect selection and processing of information, and reported voting behavior. We find that a message enhancing the self-signaling value of a Yes vote is effective: voters agree more with arguments in favor of the initiative, anticipate more frequently voting in favor, and report more frequently having voted in favor of the initiative.

Keywords: Voting, multi-wave field experiment, information selection, information processing

Suggested Citation

Mechtenberg, Lydia and Perino, Grischa and Treich, Nicolas and Tyran, Jean-Robert and Wang, Stephanie, Self-Signaling in Voting. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4057968 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4057968

Lydia Mechtenberg

University of Hamburg ( email )

Allende-Platz 1
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Grischa Perino

University of Hamburg ( email )

Welckerstr. 8
Hamburg, 20354
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/gperinosite/

Nicolas Treich

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Stephanie Wang (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh ( email )

135 N Bellefield Ave
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

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