Bidders' Entry and Auctioneer's Rejection: Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions

26 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Antonio Estache

Antonio Estache

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Atsushi Iimi

International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank

Date Written: March 1, 2009

Abstract

Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. This paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs.

Keywords: Investment and Investment Climate, Government Procurement, Markets and Market Access, Debt Markets, E-Business

Suggested Citation

Estache, Antonio and Iimi, Atsushi, Bidders' Entry and Auctioneer's Rejection: Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions (March 1, 2009). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4855, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1410476

Antonio Estache (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 (0)2 6503838 (Phone)

Atsushi Iimi

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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