Political corruption and financial statement disaggregation decisions: The role of corporate culture

36 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2024 Last revised: 6 Apr 2025

See all articles by Thanh Dat Le

Thanh Dat Le

University of Northern Colorado - Kenneth W. Montfort College of Business

Julie Ngo

Loyola Marymount University

Nguyen Nguyen

Minnesota State University Mankato

Date Written: September 1, 2024

Abstract

This study examines the effect of political corruption on firms' financial statement disaggregation over the period of 2002-2022. The authors find that firms located in states with a higher level of political corruption have less disaggregated financial statements. The empirical results suggest that firms tend to increase the opacity of financial statements to prevent financial information from being exposed to corrupt officials. However, corporate culture helps lower the negative impact of political corruption on local firm's financial disaggregation quality. The results remain robust when we carry out several robustness checks to address endogeneity concerns and when we use alternative measures of political corruption.

Keywords: financial statement disaggregation; political corruption; corporate culture.

Suggested Citation

Le, Thanh Dat and Ngo, Thuy Dung and Nguyen, Nguyen, Political corruption and financial statement disaggregation decisions: The role of corporate culture (September 1, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4963341 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4963341

Thanh Dat Le (Contact Author)

University of Northern Colorado - Kenneth W. Montfort College of Business ( email )

Kepner Hall
800 17th Street
Greeley, CO 80639
United States

Thuy Dung Ngo

Loyola Marymount University ( email )

7900 Loyola Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90045
United States

Nguyen Nguyen

Minnesota State University Mankato ( email )

College of Business - Finance, Minnesota State Uni
150 Morris Hall
Mankato, MN MN 56001-6062
United States

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